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"[149], While KSCB was abandoned, the Marines continued to patrol the Khe Sanh plateau, including reoccupying the area with ARVN forces from 519 October 1968 with minimal opposition. Of the 500 CIDG troops at Lang Vei, 200 had been killed or were missing and 75 more were wounded. Five Marines were killed on January 19 and 20, while on reconnaissance patrols. Beginning in October 1967, the Communists greatly increased their forces in the Khe Sanh area to total two infantry divisions, two artillery regiments and an armored regiment. [30], In early October, the PAVN had intensified battalion-sized ground probes and sustained artillery fire against Con Thien, a hilltop stronghold in the center of the Marines' defensive line south of the DMZ, in northern Qung Tr Province. First had been Operation Full Cry, the original three-division invasion plan. The American military presence at Khe Sanh consisted not only of the Marine Corps Khe Sanh Combat Base, but also Forward Operating Base 3, U.S. Army (FOB-3). The monumental Battle of Khe Sanh had begun, but the January 21 starting date is essentially arbitrary in terms of casualty reporting. [75] On 22 January, the first sensor drops took place, and by the end of the month, 316 acoustic and seismic sensors had been dropped in 44 strings. The Marines at KSCB credited 40% of intelligence available to their fire-support coordination center to the sensors. On January 31, while approximately 50,000 U.S. and South Vietnamese troops were occupied in defending or supporting Khe Sanh and other DMZ bases, the communists launched an offensive throughout South Vietnam. Since the Marines on board were not yet officially attached to the 26th Marine Regiment, their deaths were not included in the official Khe Sanh count, nor were the several other deaths associated with aircraft crashes. Among the dead Marines was 18-year-old Pfc Curtis Bugger. [156] Correspondent Michael Herr reported on the battle, and his account would inspire the surreal "Do Long Bridge" scene in the film Apocalypse Now, which emphasized the anarchy of the war. [23][Note 2], James Marino wrote that in 1964, General William Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam, had determined, "Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base blocking enemy infiltration from Laos; a base for operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstrip for reconnaissance to survey the Ho Chi Minh Trail; a western anchor for the defenses south of the DMZ; and an eventual jumping-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Westmoreland had been forwarding operational plans for an invasion of Laos since 1966. [172], On 30 January 1971, the ARVN and US forces launched Operation Dewey Canyon II, which involved the reopening of Route 9, securing the Khe Sanh area and reoccupying of KSCB as a forward supply base for Operation Lam Son 719. McNamara's thinking may have also been affected by his aide David Morrisroe, whose brother Michael Morrisroe was serving at the base. According to Gordon Rottman, even the North Vietnamese official history, Victory in Vietnam, is largely silent on the issue. The assault began on 10 May 1969 w ith the 101st Airborne Division and troops of the 9th M arine Regiment, the 5 th Cavalry Regiment, and the 3 rd ARVN Regiment. [171] When Hanoi made the decision to move in around the base, Khe Sanh was held by only one or two American battalions. A secret memorandum reported by US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, sent to US President Lyndon B. Johnson on 19 February 1968, was declassified in 2005. [115] This equates to roughly 1,300 tons of bombs dropped daily 5 tons for every one of the 20,000 PAVN soldiers initially estimated to have been committed to the fighting at Khe Sanh. The Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base broke out of their perimeter and began attacking the North Vietnamese in the surrounding area. [86] The command and control arrangement then in place in Southeast Asia went against Air Force doctrine, which was predicated on the single air manager concept. Scotland was a 26th Marine Regiment operation, so only the deaths of Marines assigned to the regiment, and attached supporting units, were counted. The microwave/tropo site was located in an underground bunker next to the airstrip. These combined sources report a total of 354 KIA. With a view to gain the eventual approval for an advance through Laos to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, he determined that "it was absolutely essential to hold the base." The Operation Scotland tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) was limited to the area around Khe Sanh along Route 9 in western Quang Tri province. This caused problems for the Marine command, which possessed its own aviation squadrons that operated under their own close air support doctrine. [39], On 24 April 1967, a patrol from Bravo Company became engaged with a PAVN force of an unknown size north of Hill 861. Hernandez was killed. Casualties were heavy among the attacking PAVN, who lost over 200 killed, while the defending Marines lost two men. The Armys 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), with more than 400 helicopters under its control, conducted airmobile operations deeper into enemy-controlled areas. The official statistics yield a KIA ratio of between 50:1 and 75:1 of North Vietnamese to U.S. military deaths. Both sides have published official histories of the battle, and while these histories agree the fighting took place at Khe Sanh, they disagree on virtually every other aspect of it. Rod Andrew, Jr., a history professor at Clemson University and colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve, has written an easily read and thoroughly . Operation Pegasus, begun the day after Scotland ended, lasted until April 15. The US command in Saigon initially believed that combat operations around KSCB during 1967 were part of a series of minor PAVN offensives in the border regions. A group of 12 A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers provided flak suppression for massed flights of 1216 helicopters, which would resupply the hills simultaneously. Twenty-five USAF personnel who were killed are also not included. "[105] There had been a history of distrust between the Special Forces personnel and the Marines, and General Rathvon M. Tompkins, commander of the 3rd Marine Division, described the Special Forces soldiers as "hopped up wretches [who] were a law unto themselves. For example, I served with a Marine heavy mortar battery at Khe Sanh during the siege. A historian, General Dave Palmer, accepted that rationale: "General Giap never had any intention of capturing Khe Sanh [it] was a feint, a diversionary effort. The NVA 304th Divisions history notes that on 9 July 1968, the liberation flag was waving from the flag pole at Ta Con [Khe Sanh] airfield. On July 13, 1968, Ho Chi Minh sent a message to the soldiers of the Route 9Khe Sanh Front affirming our victory at Khe Sanh.. Five more attacks against their sector were launched during March. Operation Pegasus: ~20,000 (1st Air Cavalry and Marine units), U.S. losses:At Khe Sanh: 274 killed2,541 wounded (not including ARVN Ranger, RF/PF, Forward Operation Base 3 US Army and Royal Laotian Army losses)[15]Operation Scotland I and Operation Pegasus: 730 killed2,642 wounded,7 missing[15]Operation Scotland II (15 April 1968 July 1968):485 killed2,396 wounded[1]USAF:5 ~ 20 killed, wounded unknown[1]Operation Charlie for the final evacuation:At least 11 marines killed, wounded unknown[1] [80] Westmoreland had already ordered the nascent Igloo White operation to assist in the Marine defense. Operation Scotland II continued until the end of the year, resulting in the deaths of 72 more Marines. On January 21 at Khe Sanh, 30,000 North Vietnamese troops attacked an air base held by just 6,000 United States Marines. American intelligence estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 PAVN troops were killed during the operation, equating to up to 90% of the attacking 17,200-man PAVN force. Site will be misbehaving during our migration to new (better!) The relief of Khe Sanh, called Operation Pegasus, began . [88] Westmoreland was so obsessed with the tactical situation that he threatened to resign if his wishes were not obeyed. [59], During the rainy night of 2 January 1968, six men dressed in black uniforms were seen outside the defensive wire of the main base by members of a listening post. [12], General Creighton Abrams also suggested that the North Vietnamese may have been planning to emulate Dien Bien Phu. [163] Other theories argued that the forces around Khe Sanh were simply a localized defensive measure in the DMZ area or that they were serving as a reserve in case of an offensive American end run in the mode of the American invasion at Inchon during the Korean War. By the end of May, Marine forces were again drawn down from two battalions to one, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. Operational control of the Khe Sanh area was handed over to the US Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division for the duration of Operation Pegasus. Enemy artillery rounds slammed into the runway. Throughout the campaign, US forces used the latest technology to locate PAVN forces for targeting. [58] The USAF delivered 14,356 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh by air (8,120 tons by paradrop). On July 10, Pfc Robert Hernandez of Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was manning an M-60 machine gun position when it took a direct hit from NVA mortars. In the aftermath, the North Vietnamese proclaimed a victory at Khe Sanh, while US forces claimed that they had withdrawn, as the base was no longer required. [35], American intelligence analysts were quite baffled by the series of enemy actions. One of the first enemy shells set off an explosion in the main ammunition dump. The official North Vietnamese history claimed that 400 South Vietnamese troops had been killed and 253 captured. A 77 day battle, Khe Sanh had been the biggest single battle of the Vietnam War to that point. The Marine defense of Khe Sanh, Operation Scotland, officially ended on March 31. At least 852 PAVN soldiers were killed during the action, as opposed to 50 American and South Vietnamese. North Vietnamese Army gained control of the Khe Sanh region after the American withdrawal. Known as the McNamara Line, it was initially codenamed "Project Nine". If that failed, and it did, they hoped to attack American reinforcements along Route 9 between Khe Sanh and Laos. [128] Also, Marine Lieutenant General Victor Krulak seconded the notion that there was never a serious intention to take the base by arguing that neither the water supply nor the telephone land lines were ever cut by the PAVN. For some unknown reason, the PAVN troops did not press their advantage and eliminate the pocket, instead throwing a steady stream of grenades at the Marines. "[52], Brigadier General Lowell English (assistant commander 3rd Marine Division) complained that the defense of the isolated outpost was ludicrous: "When you're at Khe Sanh, you're not really anywhere. [10] Once the news of the closure of KSCB was announced, the American media immediately raised questions about the reasoning behind its abandonment. As the relief force made progress, the Marines at Khe Sanh moved out from their positions and began patrolling at greater distances from the base. [33], On 27 October, a PAVN regiment attacked an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) battalion at Song Be, capital of Phc Long Province. With Khe Sanh facing a full-scale. Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. Later, the 1/1 Marines and 3rd ARVN Airborne Task Force (the 3rd, 6th, and 8th Airborne Battalions) would join the operation. Battle of Khe Sanh "What had been a combat base looked like rubble." A US Marine carries an American flag on his rifle during a recovery operation 6 miles south of Khe Sanh, Vietnam, June 17 . Hundreds of mortar rounds and 122-mm rockets slammed into the base, levelling most of the above-ground structures. 6,000 men North Vietnamese Vo Nguyen Giap Tran Quy Hai Approx. Its main objectives were to inflict casualties on US troops and to isolate them in the remote border regions. [1] He goes on to state that a further 72 were killed as part Operation Scotland II throughout the remainder of the year, but that these deaths are not included in the official US casualty lists for the Battle of Khe Sanh. Amid heavy shelling, the Marines attempted to salvage what they could before destroying what remained as they were evacuated. The battalion was assaulted on the night of 23 January by three PAVN battalions supported by seven tanks. [123][124], Nevertheless, the same day that the trenches were detected, 25 February, 3rd Platoon from Bravo Company 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was ambushed on a short patrol outside the base's perimeter to test the PAVN strength. [157], Commencing in 1966, the US had attempted to establish a barrier system across the DMZ to prevent infiltration by North Vietnamese troops. Due to severe losses, however, the NVA abandoned its plan for a massive ground attack. The fighting around Khe Sanh began January 21, 1968, and concluded around April 8, 1968. The battle of Khe Sanh is one of the most well-known battles of the Vietnam War. 216217. The Marine Corps casualty reporting system was based on named operations and not geographic location. The latest microwave/tropospheric scatter technology enabled them to maintain communications at all times. Khe Sanh is a village located near the Laotian border and just south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separated North and South Vietnam. [21], PAVN artillery fell on the main base for the first time on 21 January. Five Marines were killed on January 19 and 20, while on reconnaissance patrols. I suspect he is also trying to draw everyone's attention away from the greatest area of threat, the northern part of I Corps. Historian Ronald Spector, in the book After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam, noted that American casualties in the 10 weeks after the start of Operation Pegasus were more than twice those officially reported during the siege. [89] As a result, on 7 March, for the first time during the Vietnam War, air operations were placed under the control of a single manager. Find many great new & used options and get the best deals for The Hill Fights: The First Battle of Khe Sanh by Murphy, Edward F. (mass_market) at the best online prices at eBay! [22] The camp then became a Special Forces outpost of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, which were to keep watch on PAVN infiltration along the border and to protect the local population. Name State Date War Branch; 1: Steven Glenn Abbott . [126], On 30 March, Bravo Company, 26th Marines, launched an attack toward the location of the ambush that had claimed so many of their comrades on 25 February. [82], By the end of the battle, USAF assets had flown 9,691 tactical sorties and dropped 14,223tons of bombs on targets within the Khe Sanh area. [69] The Marine Direct Air Support Center (DASC), located at KSCB, was responsible for the coordination of air strikes with artillery fire. [44], On 14 August, Colonel David E. Lownds took over as commander of the 26th Marine Regiment. Let me caution everyone not to be confused. Whether the destruction of one battalion could have been the goal of two to four PAVN divisions was debatable. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, pp. [58] These tactics were reminiscent of those employed against the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, particularly in relation to entrenching tactics and artillery placement, and the realization assisted US planners in their targeting decisions. A single company replaced an entire battalion. Although the camp's main defenses were overrun in only 13 minutes, the fighting lasted for several hours, during which the Special Forces men and Bru CIDGs managed to knock out at least five of the tanks. The official figure of 205 KIA only represents Marine deaths in the Operation Scotland TAORthat is, Marines killed in proximity to the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the period from November 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968. [132], On 2 March, Tolson laid out what became known as Operation Pegasus, the operational plan for what was to become the largest operation launched by III MAF thus far in the conflict. For them, the battle started when the North Vietnamese attacks began in January. This is the battles end date from the North Vietnamese perspective. Lownds also rejected a proposal to launch a helicopter extraction of the survivors. A victory for the Americans and South Vietnamese, the Battle of Dak To cost 376 US killed, 1,441 US wounded, and 79 ARVN killed. Khe Sanh had long been responsible for the defense of Lang Vei. New material will be added to that page through the end of 2018. The Marines were extremely reluctant to relinquish authority over their aircraft to an Air Force general. A Look at the Damage from the Secret War in Laos, How Operation Homecoming Was Sprung into Action to Repatriate American POWs, The Viet Cong Were Shooting Down Americans From a Cave Until This GI Stopped Them, https://www.historynet.com/recounting-the-casualties-at-the-deadly-battle-of-khe-sanh/, Jerrie Mock: Record-Breaking American Female Pilot, When 21 Sikh Soldiers Fought the Odds Against 10,000 Pashtun Warriors, Few Red Tails Remain: Tuskegee Airman Dies at 96. [64], The main base was then subjected to an intense mortar and rocket barrage. [1], The evacuation of Khe Sanh began on 19 June 1968 as Operation Charlie. The PAVN 130mm and 152mm artillery pieces, and 122mm rockets, had a longer range than the Marine artillery support which consisted of 105mm and 155mm howitzers. Taking place between March and July 1970, the Battle of Fire. [139] The 11th Engineers proclaimed Route 9 open to traffic on 11 April. Contribute to chinapedia/wikipedia.en development by creating an account on GitHub. [140] Total US casualties during the operation were 92 killed, 667 wounded, and five missing. Mobile combat operations continued against the North Vietnamese. For most of the battle, low-lying clouds and fog enclosed the area from early morning until around noon, and poor visibility severely hampered aerial resupply. [147] The official closure of the base came on 5 July after fighting, which had killed five more Marines. The attack on Khe Sanh, however, proved to be a diversionary tactic for the larger Tet Offensive. In an unconventional war without conventional frontlines, statistics became the most critical measure of progress. [40] The 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 3rd Marine Regiment, under the command of Colonel John P. Lanigan, reinforced KSCB and were given the task of pushing the PAVN off of Hills 861, 881 North, and 881 South. [142], Lownds and the 26th Marines departed Khe Sanh, leaving the defense of the base to the 1st Marine Regiment. Khe Sanh was one of the most remote outposts in Vietnam, but by January 1968, even President Lyndon Johnson had taken a personal interest in the base. On the following night, a massive wave of PAVN/VC attacks swept throughout South Vietnam, everywhere except Khe Sanh. [146] Useful equipment was withdrawn or destroyed, and personnel were evacuated. Setting out from Ca Lu, 10 miles east of Khe Sanh, Pegasus opened the highway, linked up with the Marines at Khe Sanh, and engaged NVA in the surrounding area. [94] Although the PAVN was known to possess two armored regiments, it had not yet fielded an armored unit in South Vietnam, and besides, the Americans considered it impossible for them to get one down to Khe Sanh without it being spotted by aerial reconnaissance. [93] At 18:10 hours, the PAVN followed up their morning mortar attack with an artillery strike from 152mm howitzers, firing 60 rounds into the camp. He believed that was proved by the PAVN's actions during Tet. For additional reading, see: Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh, by John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe; and the official Marine Corps history, The Battle for Khe Sanh, by Moyers S. Shore II. [129][130] Nevertheless, according to Tom Johnson, President Johnson was "determined that Khe Sanh [would not] be an 'American Dien Bien Phu'". The report continues to state, "this prompted Air Force chief of staff, General John McConnell, to press, although unsuccessfully, for JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) authority to request Pacific Command to prepare a plan for using low-yield nuclear weapons to prevent a catastrophic loss of the U.S. Marine base. They asked what had changed in six months so that American commanders were willing to abandon Khe Sanh in July. Ho Chi Minhs oft-quoted admonition to the French applied equally to the Americans: You can kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours, but even at those odds, you will lose and I will win. The calculation by Stubbe that approximately 1,000 Americans died on the Khe Sanh battlefield is especially compelling, given that Stubbes numbers are accompanied by names and dates of death. But Pisor also pointed out that 205 is a completely false number. One had to meet certain criteria before being officially considered KIA at Khe Sanh. [151] From 12 June to 6 July 1969, Task Force Guadalcanal comprising 1/9 Marines, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment and 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 2nd ARVN Regiment occupied the Khe Sanh area in Operation Utah Mesa. No logic was apparent to them behind the sustained PAVN/VC offensives other than to inflict casualties on the allied forces. [59], Making matters worse for the defenders, any aircraft that braved the weather and attempted to land was subject to PAVN antiaircraft fire on its way in for a landing. As journalist Robert Pisor pointed out in his 1982 book, The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh, no other battle of the entire war produced a better body count or kill ratio than that claimed by the Americans at Khe Sanh.